We propose an optimum mechanism for providing monetary incentives to the data sources of a statistical estimator such as linear regression, so that high quality data is provided at low cost, in the sense that the sum of payments and estimation error is minimized. The mechanism applies to a broad range of estimators, including linear and polynomial regression, kernel regression, and, under some additional assumptions, ridge regression.
Introduction
Statistical estimation, from data, of the parameters of a model of reality, is the spirit, essence, and workhorse of modern science. In today's complex world of science and industry, data for an estimator deployed by a particular research group or enterprise is often provided by other entities; furthermore, the quality of the data is crucial for the accuracy of the estimator, and can vary widely. It is reasonable to assume that, with appropriate effort and cost, the providers of the data can improve the quality of their data -but of course they may lack incentive to do so. Crowdsourcing [9] can be seen as a popular and widespread instantiation of the phenomenon.
The situation is not unlike Mechanism Design, a well developed field in Mathematical Economics [23] , and indeed related problems in connection to crowdsourcing have been recently treated within this framework; see the references in the next subsection. In Mechanism Design, in order for the interaction of the designer with several rational strategic agents to be as beneficial as possible, a game between the agents is created in which the pursuit by the agents of individual advantage leads to the optimum outcome for the designer. Perhaps the archetypical Mechanism Design problem, solved in Myerson's celebrated work [25] , is how to auction an item to a number of agents, whose values for the item are unknown but drawn from known prior distributions. Myerson's is a powerful, sophisticated, and clean result, and has had tremendous impact-a useful ideal to keep in mind when venturing into new areas.
Coming back to estimation, suppose that a Statistician has an algorithm which, given appropriate data points X = {(x i , y i )}, approximates an unknown function f that captures an important but also for a broad class of estimators satisfying a simple and intuitive condition, and includes, for example, polynomial regression, finite dimensional kernel regression and many other linear estimators. The solution engages workers in a game not with the Statistician, but with each other. The game is constructed in such a way that, in the end, the optimum outcome is achieved, in that loss plus payments is minimized, and all "surplus" of the workers is extracted (that is, no worker is paid more than his work). One important consideration is what we mean above by "in the end," that is, what is our solution concept? After all, solution concepts are known to be delicate and fragile, the subject of endless discussions and controversy in Game Theory. It turns out that our design can afford a solution concept that is extremely robust and uncontroversial: Each worker's decision is a unique dominant strategy, that is, it is the unique action that optimizes the worker's objective (payment minus effort) no matter what anybody else does. Of course, this restricts severely the design space of games that we can employ, and despite this restriction we can still obtain the aforementioned strong guarantees.
One key idea of the mechanism is that, in the game as defined, the payment of each worker depends on the data supplied by the other workers. To some this may seem unreasonable, while to others it may seem a bit unsurprising in view of the VCG mechanism, among others, which has a similar structure [35, 6, 12] . That this maneuver works in this instance is an entirely new phenomenon related to statistical estimation, as opposed to mechanism design, and comes with a different mathematical justification, even though in a sense it does have the same roots as VCG: Our design essentially creates a race for accuracy, in which workers compete knowing that they will fare badly if left behind.
Our mechanism applies to all statistical estimators that satisfy a certain intuitive property: The expectation of the estimator's loss depends only on the data points {x i } and the distribution of the test point x * , and depends on the y i 's only through their variances. There are two variants of the problem, depending on how the x i 's are determined. So far, we have assumed that the x i 's should be optimally chosen by the algorithm/mechanism, and the estimators we can handle already include, e.g., linear regression, polynomial regression, finite-dimensional kernel regression, and several other linear estimators. In a model where the x i 's are fixed and given in advance (but the algorithm should still optimally assign them to workers) the situation is even more favorable: our technique applies to an even broader class of estimators, including ridge regression [34] . This is discussed in Section 3.1.
Related Work
For background in statistical analysis and estimation see, e.g., [14] , and for mechanism design see, e.g., [23] . In the past few years there have been several papers treating crowdsourcing in a framework that is at least superficially similar to ours. [15] gauge through experiments the elasticity of effort under pay in crowdsourcing, while [13] use learning algorithms to find the optimum crowdsourcing contract, and [29] add experts to the crowd so non-experts perform better. Scheduling mechanisms are used to manipulate the time behavior of the crowd [28, 21] , whereas [11] use incentives to match workers according to their specialization. Several papers address strategies to optimize performance keeping within budget [30, 31, 4] , while in [1] the online task assignment problem is treated as a multi-armed bandit under a budget. The optimal design of non-monetary "prestige" rewards to optimally incentivize the participants is addressed in [17] , and in [24, 18, 33] privacy concerns in data gathering are treated through incentives; also in [32] regret minimization is used in a crowdsourcing context.
A little closer to our framework, Mechanism Design has been used in [26, 3] to analyze crowdsourcing contests-in which all workers submit their work and one is selected to be paid-as all-pay auctions. These mechanisms also use monetary incentives to create a competition between workers to enhance performance, but their nature and the problems they address are quite different from ours-for example, they are by design not individually rational. In [8, 19, 20] , mechanism design is used for regression and classification with strategic data providers. In contrast to our setting, the agents are not interested in being paid for producing data for the learning task and have no cost for exerting effort. Instead, they control a subset of the data for which they already have the correct labels, and want to bias the outcome of the learning process to perform well on their subset of the data. [2] and follow-up papers design proper scoring rules for principal-agent problems where agents are asked to predict an outcome, but can also influence the outcome by exerting different levels of effort. In contrast to our setting, agents only care about rewards and have no cost for effort. More importantly, the designer only cares about how to incentivize the agents to exert maximum effort, and not how much money is paid to the agents. Moreover, they use the final outcome to decide rewards (this is common in scoring rules), while we never learn f (x * ). [7] design mechanisms for crowdsourced binary labeling, where a collection of agents are asked to provide binary labels to a collection of tasks, and the designer wants to incentivize them via monetary rewards to exert maximum effort for each task. The agents' strategy consists on how much effort to exert for each task they are allocated (where increased effort increases their cost but also the probability of correct labeling), and whether to truthfully report the labels of their allocated tasks. Besides being for a different learning task, the biggest difference to our paper lies in the fact that the designer does not care about how much money is paid to the agents, or the tradeoff between rewards and accuracy. Finally, [10] look at a problem close to ours except they assume that each worker cannot affect their quality (it is sampled from a prior distribution), but only decide whether to participate in the mechanism; they also only consider the simple unbiased estimator for constant functions from R to R.
Estimation with Strategic Workers
In this section, we introduce the statistical estimation task that we solve in the next section. We start with some standard definitions.
Definition 1 (Estimator). Let H be a family of functions
For example, H may be the class of linear functions from R n to R, in which case the estimator could be linear regression. If the input (x i , y i ) k i=1 to the estimator is clear from context, we may omit it from the subscript off . Sometimes we use ( x, y) as a shorthand for (x i , y i ) k i=1 , and usê f ( x, y) to denote the estimator. We may also use the shorthandf −j orf ( x, y) −j for the output of the estimator when given all examples except (x j , y j ); i.e.f −j f (x i ,y i ) i∈{1,...,k}\{j} f ( x, y) −j . This is assuming that our estimator is well-defined with one example omitted. Whenever we use this notation we assume that our estimator satisfies this property. We callf −j the estimatorf with one example less.
In estimation it is usually assumed that the examples are readily available. Here we study the scenario in which we choose a collection x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ D of points and assign them to experts, who then return estimates of the function f at those points. How good will these estimates be? In this paper we assume that the experts, or workers, are strategic; for example, they will put no effort into producing good estimates of the function value at their given point, unless they are provided monetary incentives to exert such effort. We capture the behavior of such strategic experts in the following definition.
Definition 2 (Strategic Worker). Let f ∈ H be as in Definition 1. A worker for f is a strategic agent who, given some query x ∈ D, will decide how much effort e ∈ E ⊆ R + to exert in order to produce an estimate y(e) of f (x). 3 The worker:
• is characterized by some known strictly decreasing convex function σ : E → R + such that, whenever effort e is exerted, the estimate produced satisfies:
where ǫ ∼ N (0, σ(e) 2 ); 4
• aims to minimize the amount of exerted effort to produce the estimate of f (x), unless provided monetary incentives to do otherwise; in particular, if the worker is promised a payment function p : D × R → R that assigns to each pair (x, y) of a query point x and estimate y a dollar amount p(x, y), then the worker will choose to exert an amount of effort
where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness in y and the randomness in the payment function, if any. 5 The following definition formulates the problem of estimating an unknown function f ∈ H, when one's only access to f is through strategic workers for f .
Definition 3 (Estimation with Strategic Workers (ESW)
). Suppose that we are given:
• an estimatorf for a family of functions H, as in Definition 1;
• access to a set W of strategic workers for some unknown function f ∈ H, as in Definition 2, where each worker i ∈ W has a known function σ i mapping effort to accuracy; we also assume that all workers' estimations are independent;
• a distribution F over D (the distribution of the test point x * ∈ D).
Our goal is to:
1. choose some subset W ′ ⊆ W of workers 2. provide an input x i to each worker i ∈ W ′ , requesting an estimate y i of f (x i ) from i 3. commit to a payment function p i to each i ∈ W ′ , where p i is a randomized mapping p i : (x i , y i ) i∈W ′ → R, which may depend not only on the estimate produced by worker i but also the estimates produced by the other workers.
3 Note that we have omitted the dependence of y on x in our notation to ease notation. 4 Here, N (µ, σ 2 ) represents the Gaussian distribution of mean µ and variance σ 2 . 5 Note again that we have omitted the dependence of e * on x and the payment function p(·) in our notation.
Subject to our decisions in 1, 2 and 3, we are looking to minimize the mean-square error of our estimationf plus the payments we make to the workers, namely:
where the expectation is taken with respect to all the randomness in the setting: the randomness in x * ∼ F , the randomness in the outputs y( e * ) {y i (e * i )} i∈W ′ produced by the workers, and the randomness in the payment functions. Moreover, the e * i 's are taken to be the optimal effort levels chosen by the workers in the unique dominant strategy equilibrium of the game among workers induced by our decisions-see Definition 4, if it exists. If a unique dominant strategy equilibrium does not exist, we replace (1) by +∞ in evaluating how good our decisions are.
Remark: In the above formulation we assume that the designer optimizes over the selection of the points x i . Alternatively, it could be that each expert i comes with a point x i , which is "his expertise," or that the x i 's are predetermined but the designer can still decide how to assign them to experts. In Section 3.1, we briefly discuss this variant of our problem, which yields a much richer class of estimators for which our result, described in the next section, applies.
It is important to note that the form of the payment functions (Decision 3 in Definition 3) couples the decision of each worker i about the amount of effort he exerts with the amounts of effort the other workers exert (since these influence y −i ), which themselves depend on y i and hence the effort that worker i exerts. This cyclical dependence is familiar in Game Theory. Indeed, any solution to ESW-comprising a subset W ′ of workers, queries (x i ) i∈W ′ to them, and payment commitments (p i ) i∈W ′ -induces a game among the workers in W ′ ; the effort levels (e * j ) j∈W ′ eventually chosen by the workers comprise the outcome of their strategic interaction in this game. Therefore, we now need to define our solution concept, that is, a multivalued map from such games to worker behaviors. Among the many alternative solution concepts (that is, Nash equilibrium and its refinements), we choose perhaps the most compelling and uncontroversial: Unique dominant strategy equilibrium, defined next. Note that, in general, it is very rare for a game to have such an outcome, and consequently this poses a significant constraint on our design. While our main result (Theorem 1) satisfies this constraint, it nevertheless does not sacrifice any bit of objective value, fairing as well as it would without this constraint present; see the discussion following the statement of Theorem 1.
Definition 4 (Unique Dominant Strategy Equilibrium).
A solution to ESW-comprising a subset W ′ of workers, queries (x i ) i∈W ′ , and payment commitments (p i ) i∈W ′ -induces a unique dominant strategy equilibrium (e * i ) i∈W ′ iff, for all i ∈ W ′ and all (e j ) j∈W ′ :
where the expectation is with respect to everything that is random, with equality only if e i = e * i . In words, no matter what effort levels the other workers choose, the unique optimal effort level of every worker i is e * i .
Finally, not all solutions to the ESW problem are realistic. Since the workers are assumed strategic and their participation is voluntary, they should not be making a loss when participating. This is captured by the following definition, adding an additional requirement to our solutions to ESW.
Definition 5 (Individual Rationality).
A solution to ESW-comprising a subset W ′ of workers, queries (x i ) i∈W ′ , and payment commitments (p i ) i∈W ′ , satisfies individual rationality iff, for all workers i ∈ W ′ ,
where (e * i ) i∈W ′ is the unique dominant strategy equilibrium induced by the solution.
Optimal Estimation with Strategic Workers
Does a solution to the ESW always exist? It is easy to see that there are simple estimators for which no solution is possible. Our main contribution is to establish the existence of such a solution for a broad class of estimatorsf , containing several familiar ones:
Definition 6. An estimatorf for H, as in Definition 1, is well-behaved iff there exists some function g such that, for all distributions F over D, functions f ∈ H, and vectors x ∈ D * and σ ∈ R * + (of the same dimension as x): 6
where for the purposes of the expectation on the left hand side x * ∼ F and, independently for all i,
, (and when x is such thatf ( x, y) is well-defined). Note that several common estimators, such as linear regression, polynomial regression, finitedimensional kernel estimation, are well-behaved according to our definition. 7 Our main result is the existence of an optimal algorithm for ESW, wheneverf is well-behaved, according to Definition 6, and well-defined with one example less. 8 We note that the first condition is a sufficient condition and discuss how to relax it in Section 3.1. The second condition is necessary for interesting solutions to ESW, and we discuss how it can be removed by broadening the set of allowable payment functions in Section 3.1. Besides optimality, our algorithm solves ESW in a rather strong sense, as captured by Properties 2 and 3 in the following theorem. Theorem 1. There exists an optimal algorithm for ESW for all well-behaved estimatorsf that are well-defined with one example less. The algorithm:
1. produces a solution to ESW that induces a unique dominant strategy equilibrium that satisfies individual rationality;
2. achieves optimal objective value (1), which matches the following quantity:
6 We use the shorthand D * ∞ i=1 D i , and similarly for R * + . 7 For instance, iff is linear regression then
where X is the matrix whose rows are [x T i , 1] and diag( σ 2 ) is the diagonal matrix whose (i, i) entry is σ 2 i . 8 An estimator is not well-defined with one example less if omitting one example from its input makes the output of the estimator undefined. For example, iff is linear regression (for linear functions from R n to R) restricted to take as input exactly n + 1 examples (xi, yi), then it is not well-defined with one example less, since n examples won't suffice to produce an estimate.
where for the purposes of the expectation we assume that, for all i ∈ W ′ ,
3. extracts optimal worker surplus; in particular, the expected utility of every worker is 0 at the unique dominant strategy equilibrium.
Notice that Quantity (2) clearly provides a lower bound to the objective value of any solution to ESW that satisfies individual rationality. Indeed, take any solution to ESW that induces a unique dominant strategy equilibrium (e * i ) i∈W ′ and satisfies individual rationality. By individual rationality for all workers combined,
Hence, (1) ≥ (2). In fact, (2) corresponds to the objective value that one would achieve, if one could dictate the effort level that each worker should exert and only paid workers exactly for the amount of effort they exerted and not a cent more. So, in fact, Property 2 implies Property 3 in our theorem above. What our theorem establishes is that there always exist solutions to ESW that induce a dominant strategy equilibrium satisfying individual rationality, and that these solutions achieve the same objective value that a central dictator who could dictate the behavior of each worker would achieve. Even though we do not assume we have such power, we still achieve the same objective value that such a powerful dictator would. Proof of Theorem 1: We design a solution to ESW whose unique dominant strategy equilibrium e * satisfies individual rationality, and achieves objective value (1) that equals Quantity (2). We have already argued that if we do this, we immediately satisfy Properties 1, 2 and 3 in the statement of the theorem.
We define our solution to ESW in terms of an arbitrary optimal solution W ′ , (x i , e i ) i∈W ′ to the minimization problem (2) . In terms of this solution:
• We choose the same set of workers W ′ and assign to each i ∈ W ′ the point x i .
• It remains to define our payment commitments to the workers. To each worker i ∈ W ′ , we commit to the payment: 9
for some c i , d i to be chosen. Notice that the payment to worker i depends also on the reports of the other workers.
We now choose the constants (c i , d i ) i∈W ′ so that our solution induces a unique dominant strategy equilibrium e * that satisfies individual rationality (with equality) and also e * ≡ e, where e = (e i ) i∈W ′ is as in the solution to (2) that we have fixed. What is the expected payment to worker i if the workers exert some arbitrary efforts e ′ ? Denoting y( e ′ ) = (y i (e ′ i )) i∈W ′ , we have:
For compactness, we denote by ( x, y) = (xi, yi) i∈W ′ .
where we used that our estimatorf is well-behaved, according to Definition 6, and the independence of the estimation of worker i and the other workers. We denote by σ −i ( e ′ −i ) = (σ j (e ′ j )) j =i , and by 1 x i the distribution that samples x i with probability 1. g is a known function determined by the estimator according to Definition 6. Since each worker i ∈ W ′ is assumed rational, aiming to maximize his expected payment minus exerted effort, if the other workers exert effort levels e ′ −i , worker i's best response is found by solving the maximization problem:
Taking derivative with respect to e ′ i and setting to 0 gives the following condition for the optimum e * i :
In order to ensure that e * i ≡ e i , where e i was the effort level computed by solving (2), we set
Given that σ i (·) is convex decreasing, our setting of d i ensures that e i is the unique solution to (4). So our choice of (d i ) i∈W ′ has made sure that the unique dominant strategy equilibrium of the game among workers defined by our solution to ESW (regardless of the c i 's) is (e i ) i∈W ′ . Now we set the c i 's so that this equilibrium also satisfies individual rationality tightly. It suffices to choose, for each i ∈ W ′ :
This choice makes sure that the expected payment to each worker equals his effort. Hence, the unique dominant strategy equilibrium of the game among workers defined by our solution to ESW is e and it satisfies:
Hence, the objective value (1) achieved by the unique dominant strategy equilibrium matches (2) . This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Discussion and Extensions
One of the conditions in Theorem 1 is that the estimatorf is well-defined with one example less. Without it, we cannot hope for any interesting solutions to ESW. As a trivial example, suppose that f is the unbiased estimator of constant functions from R to R, which takes as input one example (x, y) and outputs y. In this casef is not well-defined with one example less, and no interesting solutions to ESW exist, since the payments to a worker may only depend on his own report, and hence the worker will put the minimal effort in set E, regardless of our payment, as long as our payment is at least that minimal effort. (Recall that, since we never learn the unknown function f we cannot use it to penalize the worker.) In this example, our constraint thatf is well-defined with one example less effectively says that we need to use at least two workers for estimating constant functions from R to R. We point out that this requirement can be removed in settings where the test point x * and the function value f (x * ) can be observed by the Statistician and the experts. We can then treat (x * , f (x * )) as an additional example with zero variance, and modify (3) to include that example in f .
Finally, our condition thatf is well-behaved does not contain regularized estimators, such as ridge regression. As ridge regression is biased, its mean square error also includes a bias term that depends on f . The issue is that this term will appear in every worker's expected payment (if we use payments as in (3)), and, since f is unknown, the workers can't evaluate their expected utilities exactly, and thus can't decide if it's beneficial for them to participate in the mechanism. We point out that, under the assumption that the x i 's are fixed in advance (but the Statistician is still allowed to optimally assign them to workers) we can modify our payments to also accommodate ridge regression. Roughly, we can use any unbiased estimatorf and add another term (f −f ) 2 to the payment function (both estimators applied to the examples from the other workers). The extra term will cancel the bias in expectation and will allow the workers to reason about their optimal behavior even without knowing f . Note that the new term will introduce some extra terms in the expected utility, but these only depend on known quantities such as the variances, and the worker will be able to reason about his optimal behavior.
